Published in Journal of Social Ontology, 2021
A libertarian justification of property rights in modern (credit and fiat) money, grounded in the self-ownership principle rather than the Lockean appropriation of natural resources.
Published in Synthese, 2022
Surveys problems facing existing infinite frequency principles of direct inference, and proposes a new version that avoids them by not relying on a notion of chance.
Published in Synthese, 2022
Argues that popular country-level measures of inequality of opportunity are potentially biased, because they use correlational data to estimate what are really causal quantities.
Published in Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 2023
An invited reflection on the methodological and empirical contributions honoured by the 2021 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, and on the ongoing disputes between causal frameworks in econometrics.
Published in Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 2024
A review of Thomas Kelly’s Bias: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press, 2022).
Forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy, 2025
Responds to Pust’s defence of double-halfing against Titelbaum’s challenge, arguing that double halfers face a distinctive embarrassment about which evidence counts as admissible for direct inference.
Preprint in PhilSci-Archive, 2026
If Sleeping Beauty dreams, even principles accepted by Lewisian halfers force her credence in heads below 1/2 on waking — a pressure towards the thirder solution from within halfer commitments.
Published in Australasian Philosophical Review, 2026
Shows that Andreas and Günther’s factual-difference-making theory of actual causation is equivalent to a counterfactual theory, undercutting their argument against counterfactual approaches.
Published in Mind, 2026
A formal diagnosis of the Two-Envelope Paradox using modern probability theory, showing that paradoxical arguments fail for one of three precisely characterizable reasons.
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A defence of the ‘‘perception approach’’ to defining and measuring discrimination against recent criticisms by Kohler-Hausmann and Weinberger, using causal models.
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Comments delivered at a seminar with Nobel laureate Guido Imbens that I organised at EIPE. In response to Imbens (2020), I argue that the potential-outcomes and DAG frameworks are complementary: PO is best suited for developing particular causal methods, while graphical models are best suited for formulating and verifying causal assumptions.
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Introducing a counterfactual theory of actual causation built on structural equation models, developed to better match the causal intuitions that philosophers bring to standard scenarios such as Suzy and Billy’s rocks.
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Revisiting the disputes between the potential-outcomes and graphical frameworks in econometrics, building on my 2023 paper and Imbens’s response. I argue that economists need causal graphs too.
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An argument against the standard comparative definition of discrimination (treating someone worse than a suitable comparator), in favour of a simpler causal definition that does not require a comparator.
Master course, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, 2025
A master-level seminar on Bayesian epistemology, taught through probability puzzles. Each session centres on a puzzle that probes a principle of rationality central to Bayesianism — conditionalization, the principle of indifference, direct inference from frequencies, and others — with the aim of developing a deeper understanding of these principles and their problems.