Factual Difference-Making is Equivalent to a Counterfactual Theory

In ‘Factual Difference-Making’, Holger Andreas and Mario Günther (2025) propose a theory of model-relative actual causation which performs remarkably well on a number of known problematic cases. They take this to show that we should abandon our counterfactual way of thinking about causation in favour of their factual alternative. I cast doubt on this argument by offering two similar theories. First, I show that the theory of Factual Difference-Making is equivalent to a partly counterfactual theory. Second, I give a fully counterfactual theory that makes the same judgments in the scenarios discussed by Andreas and Günther.

Recommended citation: Lennart B. Ackermans (2025). "Factual Difference-Making is Equivalent to a Counterfactual Theory" Australasian Philosophical Review, 9(2), pp. 205-212.
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