Preprint in PhilSci-Archive, 2026
If Sleeping Beauty dreams, even principles accepted by Lewisian halfers force her credence in heads below 1/2 on waking — a pressure towards the thirder solution from within halfer commitments.
Published in Mind, 2026
A formal diagnosis of the Two-Envelope Paradox using modern probability theory, showing that paradoxical arguments fail for one of three precisely characterizable reasons.
Published in Australasian Philosophical Review, 2026
Shows that Andreas and Günther’s factual-difference-making theory of actual causation is equivalent to a counterfactual theory, undercutting their argument against counterfactual approaches.
Forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy, 2025
Responds to Pust’s defence of double-halfing against Titelbaum’s challenge, arguing that double halfers face a distinctive embarrassment about which evidence counts as admissible for direct inference.
Published in Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 2023
An invited reflection on the methodological and empirical contributions honoured by the 2021 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, and on the ongoing disputes between causal frameworks in econometrics.
Published in Synthese, 2022
Argues that popular country-level measures of inequality of opportunity are potentially biased, because they use correlational data to estimate what are really causal quantities.
Published in Synthese, 2022
Surveys problems facing existing infinite frequency principles of direct inference, and proposes a new version that avoids them by not relying on a notion of chance.
Published in Journal of Social Ontology, 2021
A libertarian justification of property rights in modern (credit and fiat) money, grounded in the self-ownership principle rather than the Lockean appropriation of natural resources.
Published in Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 2024
A review of Thomas Kelly’s Bias: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press, 2022).